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A retrospective glance at the path of Ricœurian philosophical anthropology now allows us 
to recognize the importance of the question of affectivity in Ricœur’s early works. The 
philosophical rehabilitation of affectivity, carried out by Ricœur from Freedom and Nature: the 
Voluntary and the Involuntary and Fallible Man onwards, leads us to the central ontological problem 
of human fragility and man's capacity for initiative. In the transition from “I can” to “I do” a certain 
tension has already come into play between the fragile human being and the responsible human 
being, which Ricœur’s ethics of solicitude and human vulnerability will explore in the 1990s. It is 
precisely the essential contributions that an analysis of the ontological and anthropological 
functions of affectivity makes to the Ricœurian theorization of ethics that this issue has 
endeavoured to define. 
From Freedom and Nature: the Voluntary and the Involuntary onwards Ricœur explores the 
deep sources of human freedom; and the analyses of Fallible Man invite us to try to find in affectivity 
man’s “opening” up to the world of persons. In the same way, in History and Truth and in other 
texts of the same period, Ricœur is already wondering about the possibility of seeking “in feelings 
the revelation of the existence of others” (1954, 340).1 Nonetheless, we will have to wait until the 
1980s (especially for From Text to Action) for the question of intersubjectivity to be truly explored; 
and it is only from Oneself as Another onwards that the question of the other, in its ethical dimension, 
becomes a central theme of Ricœur's reflection. 
We have chosen the title, “Affectivity, Initiative, Fragility and Vulnerability in the 
Philosophical Anthropology of Ricœur” for this issue because it seemed to us that a retrospective 
reading of the phenomenological and ontological contributions of the constitution of the affective 
fragility of man in the Philosophy of Will would clarify the ethical question of the initiative and 
power of the responsible human being in Ricœur’s work. From this point of view, the exploration 
of the specifically bodily and affective anchoring of our capacity for initiative appeared to us to be 
fundamental because in the first place it allows access to a detailed analysis of Ricœur’s ethical and 
political reflection as well as a better understanding of the notion of human vulnerability (a notion 
that will replace that of fragility, particularly in The Just and Reflections on the Just). In our opinion, 
another thing that makes a return to the treatment of the question of affectivity in the early days of 
Ricœur’s thought interesting is the fact that it leads to a renewed reading of the relations between 
teleology and ethics in Ricœur at the same time as it sheds new light on the sense of this recovery 
of the moral norm – linked to the question of justice – at the level of the more original character of 
the feeling of love that operates in the works of the later Ricœur. Beyond these essential 
contributions, Ricœur’s theory of the passions – developed in Chapter IV of Fallible Man – can also 
be read as the outline of an analysis of the properly ethical consequences of the tension – between 
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fragility and responsibility, desire and the performance capabilities of a sensible life – which 
characterizes the human self. It already reveals a self that is traversed by conflicts inherent in life 
and confronted with the tragedy of action, that is to say, a self that is vulnerable because it is 
sometimes unable to say, to do, to recount and to answer for itself faced with the call of the other. 
This thematic issue opens with a contribution by Beatriz Contreras Tasso and Patricio 
Mena Malet entitled “Le risque d’être soi-même. Le consentement et l’affectivité comme 
fondements de l’éthique ricœurienne.” The hypothesis, serving as a main thread for this article, is 
that the Ricœurian ethics of solicitude and vulnerability expounded in Oneself as Another cannot be 
thought without taking account of the anthropological and ontological reflections that the 
philosopher develops over a period that extends from his first great phenomenological project up 
to his mature work. Starting with a reading of a little known text on the topic of risk, written when 
Ricœur was still very young (1936), the two authors then devote themselves to a very detailed 
exploration of the issue of consent and affectivity in the Philosophy of the Will in order to reveal the 
inchoate foundations of the ethics developed in the philosopher's late works. This study derives its 
benefit from the fact that it does not make do with bringing to light the genesis of Ricœur’s ethical 
thought, but it also throws a new light on the dynamic relations between pathos and praxis. 
It is precisely this question of the relations between pathos and praxis that is at the heart of 
Emmanuel Nal’s article entitled, “Ce que l’action doit à l’affection. Éléments d’une 
phénoménologie de l’initiative chez Ricœur.” The author examines the question of the genesis of 
initiative and sets out to show how, in Ricœur’s thinking, human action and initiative find their 
anchorage in affection. To this end, he starts with a detailed analysis of the question of the owned 
body centred on the notion of “affective perception” with a view to linking together the ethical 
intention and a desire whose content is explained with reference to Ricœur’s interpretation of 
Plato’s thumos. The original passivity manifested in affection then appears as the foundation of the 
self’s power of initiative as well as its ability to hold itself accountable for its actions. Finally, the 
author tries to show how initiative confers its meaning on Ricœur’s ethics by facilitating a dynamic 
link-up between its teleological and deontological dimensions. 
The question of the owned body is also at the centre of Jean-Luc Amalric’s article entitled, 
“La médiation vulnérable : puissance, acte et passivité chez Ricœur.” The author sets out to address 
the question of embodiment in Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology, choosing to focus his analysis 
on these two major works: the Philosophy of the Will and Oneself as Another. He argues that Ricœur’s 
thought on embodiment consists in developing an analysis of the lived body as fragile mediation, 
striving to articulate two complementary dialectics. A first dialectic of act and power expresses the 
ontological and operating character of this dynamic process of mediation, while a second dialectic 
of activity and passivity points to the limits and to the vulnerability of this mediation. The articulation 
of these two dialectics constituting our affective experience of embodiment can then ultimately be 
read as a dialectic of structure and event whose ethical and ontological character is at the heart of 
Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology. 
The next two articles have chosen, for their part, to speak more directly about the question 
of the person and the formation of self-identity. In an article entitled, “À travers la vulnérabilité et 
l’effort. De la personne que nous deviendrons,” Vinicio Busacchi intends to show how the dialectic 
of vulnerability and effort constitutes the person’s emancipatory driving force. The author opens 
his reflection with a confrontation between Ricœur and Levinas’ respective contributions to the 
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development of a phenomenology of vulnerability. From this perspective, the experience of 
vulnerability appears inevitably linked both to a certain affective relationship to otherness and to 
a certain effort through which the self attempts to take the form of a person. It is this “becoming a 
person” that the author then tries to reflect upon by analyzing – in the light of the influence of Jean 
Nabert’s reflexive philosophy – the passage from “fallible man” to “the capable human being,” 
which is accomplished in Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology. In the light of these analyses, the 
article finally turns its attention to the question of the impenetrableness of the suffering and the 
vulnerability of mental illness.  
In his article, “La ‘faille’ chez Paul Ricœur. De l’identité symbolique et narrative, à l’identité 
gestuelle et langagière,” Guilhem Causse also raises questions about the formation of self-identity 
in Ricœur, but this time it is to insist on the “fault” or otherness that runs through it according to 
the two different versions of Ricœurian anthropology  that we find in Fallible Man and Oneself as 
Another. First, the author endeavors to define what it is that makes the thematization of fault and 
human frailty in these two moments of the work of Ricœur continuous, but also how they differ, 
in order to then initiate a critique of the Ricœurian conception of identity. The last part of the article 
then focuses on Ricœur’s analysis of myths in The Symbolism of Evil in order to show that, in its 
insistence on the linguistic, symbolic and narrative dimension of our experience, it is again stymied 
by a fault that is both that of language in “its dual adherence to the symbolic and the conceptual” 
and that of the broken universe of myths. For the author, who denounces the privilege that Ricœur 
accords to the linguistic dimension, it is a reconsideration of the role of biblically inspired rites in 
their opposition to rites of participation in an original (and “faultless”) Act that would make it 
possible to rethink the question of identity in the light of gesture and the body.  
In the following article entitled, “A Poetics of the Self. Ricoeur’s Philosophy of the Will and 
Living Metaphor as Creative Praxis,” Iris J. Brooke Gildea strives to lay the conceptual groundwork 
for a “poetics of the self” by making an original comparison between the philosophy of the will, 
developed in Ricœur’s early works, and the theory of the living metaphor, which the philosopher 
worked out subsequently. The point of making such a comparison is that it helps us to see living 
metaphor as a creative ability that radiates human praxis at the same time as it makes it possible 
to interpret affectivity as the locus of the dynamic intersection between the linguistic, 
anthropological, and ontological dimensions of the capable human being. The author first 
endeavors to link the tension constituent of human disproportion and affective fragility to the 
tensional status of metaphorical truth, in order to then linger over the significance of the act of 
writing poetry. In her eyes, such an act can be considered an aesthetic mediation through which a 
better understanding of the original discord of the human will is discovered. 
Morny Joy’s article, “Ricœur’s Affirmation of Life in this World and his Journey to Ethics,” 
which brings this thematic issue to a close, aims to give an overview of Ricœur’s entire ethical and 
anthropological journey from the Philosophy of the Will through to Oneself as Another and the 
philosopher’s late works. According to the author, it is in order to fight against injustice and the 
inhumanity of the unmerited suffering that human beings inflict on others that Ricœur strove to 
develop an ethical approach based on affirmation and the search for “the good life, with and for 
others, in just institutions.” In this journey, which takes us from fallible man to the capable human 
being, the author points to the decisive influence that the thought of Hannah Arendt had on 
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Ricœur’s philosophy and, at the same time, she underscores the continuity of an ethical itinerary 
that has led Ricœur to further deepen the ontological foundations of human fragility. 
Beatriz Contreras Tasso and Patricio Mena Malet 
Translated by Eileen Brennan 
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1 Paul Ricœur, “Sympathie et respect,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 59 (1954), 380-97. 
 
